Kabul 30 years ago, and
Kabul today.
Have we learned nothing?
I
sit on the rooftop of the old Central Hotel - pharaonic-decorated
elevator, unspeakable apple juice, sublime green tea, and
armed Tajik guards at the front door - and look out across
the smoky red of the Kabul evening. The Bala Hissar fort glows
in the dusk, massive portals, the great keep to which the
British army should have moved its men in 1841. Instead, they
felt the king should live there and humbly built a cantonment
on the undefended plain, thus leading to a "signal catastrophe".
Like automated birds, the kites swoop over the rooftops. Yes,
the kite-runners of Kabul, minus Hollywood. At night, the
thump of American Sikorsky helicopters and the whisper of
high-altitude F-18s invade my room. The United States of America
is settling George Bush's scores with the "terrorists"
trying to overthrow Hamid Karzai's corrupt government.
Now rewind almost 29 years, and I am on the balcony of the
Intercontinental Hotel on the other side of this great, cold,
fuggy city. Impeccable staff, frozen Polish beer in the bar,
secret policemen in the front lobby, Russian troops parked
in the forecourt. The Bala Hissar fort glimmers through the
smoke. The kites - green seems a favourite colour - move beyond
the trees. At night, the thump of Hind choppers and the whisper
of high-altitude MiGs invade my room. The Soviet Union is
settling Leonid Brezhnev's scores with the "terrorists"
trying to overthrow Barbrak Karmal's corrupt government.
Thirty miles north, all those years ago, a Soviet general
told us of the imminent victory over the "terrorists"
in the mountains, imperialist "remnants" - the phrase
Kabul communist radio always used - who were being supported
by America and Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.
Fast forward to 2001 - just seven years ago - and an American
general told us of the imminent victory over the "terrorists"
in the mountains, the all but conquered Taliban who were being
supported by Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. The Russian was pontificating
at the big Soviet airbase at Bagram. The American general
was pontificating at the big US airbase at Bagram.
This is not déjà-vu. This is déjà
double-vu. And it gets worse.
Almost 29 years ago, the Afghan "mujahedin" began
a campaign to end the mixed schooling of boys and girls in
the remote mountain passes, legislation pushed through by
successive communist governments. Schools were burned down.
Outside Jalalabad, I found a headmaster and his headmistress
wife burned to death. Today, the Afghan Taliban are campaigning
to end the mixed schooling of boys and girls - indeed the
very education of young women - across the great deserts of
Kandahar and Helmand. Schools have been burned down. Teachers
have been executed.
As the Soviets began to suffer more and more casualties, their
officers boasted of the increasing prowess of the Afghan National
Army, the ANA. Infiltrated though they were by the "mujahedin",
Moscow gave them newer tanks and helped to train new battalions
to take on the guerrillas outside the capital.
Fast forward to now. As the Americans and British suffer ever
greater casualties, their officers boast of the increasing
prowess of the ANA. Infiltrated though they are by the Taliban,
America and other Nato states are providing them with newer
equipment and training new battalions to take on the guerrillas
outside the capital. Back in January of 1980, I could take
a bus from Kabul to Kandahar. Seven years later, the broken
highway was haunted by "mujahedin" fighters and
bandits and the only safe way to travel to Kandahar was by
air.
In the immediate aftermath of America's arrival here in 2001,
I could take a bus from Kabul to Kandahar. Now, seven years
later, the highway - rebuilt on the express instructions of
George W but already cracked and swamped with sand - is haunted
by Taliban fighters and bandits and the only safe way to travel
to Kandahar is by air.
Throughout the 1980s, the Soviets and the ANA held the towns
but lost most of the country. Today, America and its allies
and the ANA hold most of the towns but have lost the southern
half of the country. The Soviets secretly sent another 9,000
troops to join their 115,000-strong occupation force to fight
the "mujahedin". Today, the Americans are publicly
sending another 7,000 troops to join their 55,000-strong occupation
force to fight the Taliban.
In 1980, I would sneak down to Chicken Street to buy old books
in the dust-filled shops, cheap and illegal Pakistani reprints
of the memoirs of British Empire officers while my driver
watched anxiously lest I be mistaken for a Russian. Last week,
I sneaked down to the Shar Book shop, which is filled with
the very same illicit volumes, while my driver watched anxiously
lest I be mistaken for an American (or, indeed, a Brit). I
find Stephen Tanner's Afghanistan: A Military History From
Alexander The Great To The Fall Of The Taliban and drive back
to my hotel through the streets of wood-smoked Kabul to read
it in my ill-lit room.
In 1840, Tanner writes, Britain's supply line from the Pakistani
city of Karachi up through the Khyber Pass and Jalalabad to
Kabul was being threatened by Afghan fighters, "British
officers on the crucial supply line through Peshawar... insulted
and attacked". I fumble through my bag for a clipping
from a recent copy of Le Monde. It marks Nato's main supply
route from the Pakistani city of Karachi up through the Khyber
Pass and Jalalabad to Kabul, and illustrates the location
of each Taliban attack on the convoys bringing fuel and food
to America's allies in Afghanistan.
Then I prowl through one of the Pakistani retread books I
have found and discover General Roberts of Kandahar telling
the British in 1880 that "we have nothing to fear from
Afghanistan, and the best thing to do is to leave it as much
as possible to itself... I feel sure I am right when I say
that the less the Afghans see of us, the less they will dislike
us".
(Courtesy: Daily Times Lahore)